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This thesis examines the conduct  of  Forest  Stewardship  Council (FSC) regarding the 
certification stringency in the  boreal  biome.  Certification is less stringent in  Russia as 
compared to other boreal nations; Canada, Sweden, Norway and Finland. Further, it wil 
elaborate on Motion 65 by FSC on how it relates to the main topic. According to recent 
studies, FSC certification auditing is less thorough in Russia as compared to Canada and 
Nordic  Countries. In  Canada and  Nordic countries,  FSC is a  very stringent and 
scrupulous  body,  making certificate  holders  work  hard to  keep their status.  In  2014, 
FSC  has released its  Motion  65 to  protect Intact  Forest  Landscapes, and a set  of 
recommendations folowed in late 2016. If approved, Motion 65 would unequaly afect 
Canada and  Nordic  Countries as compared to  Russia.  Forest  Code  of the  Russian 
Federation does not recognize IFLs, which are key principle of Motion 65. This thesis 
concluded that  part  of the  problem is that  while forestry regulations  of  Canada and 
Nordic countries are in tandem with FSC guidelines, Russia’s laws conflict with them. 
Another part of the issue is lack of equity distribution in Russia as compared to Canada 
and  Nordic  Countries.  The thesis suggests that  FSC  needs to  develop a strategy 
specificaly tailored to  Russia, in  order to achieve levels  of compliance and 
socioeconomic equity similar to Canada and Nordic Countries. 
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This thesis wil study efects of Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) on forestry in boreal 
Canada,  Finland,  Norway,  Sweden, and  Russia.  Ecosystems are similar throughout the 
boreal  biome and certification  of forestry  practices should reflect that. In  Russia 
however,  FSC  does  not audit the companies as thorough as in  other aforementioned 
boreal countries,  making it  possible for a  portion  of ilegaly  harvested  wood to  get 
certified.  Furthermore,  FSCs lack  of efort to enforce its  policies  on equitable 
distribution  of  welfare  generated  by forestry  operations exacerbates  pre existing 
socioeconomic problems surounding forestry in Russia (Maletz and Tysiachniouk 2009; 
Lukashevich et al. 2016; Ulybina and Fennel (2013). 
In 2014, FSC together with Greenpeace have drafted what is now known as ‘Motion 65’ 
(see Appendix), a document whose purpose is to significantly reduce forestry operations 
in Intact Forest Landscapes (IFL). Forest Code of Russian Federation does not recognize 
IFLs.  According to  Tysiachniouk and  McDermot (2016)  Russian  branch  of  FSC  has 
been lacking in its eforts to reduce logging in  high conservation  value forests that 
usualy fal within IFLs. This issue wil be further discussed in this thesis as it related to 
the main objective of the thesis. 
This thesis wil atempt to answer the folowing question; 
● Does  FSC in  Russian  Federation folow a  more lenient approach towards 
certification than in  Canada and a  block  of  Nordic countries,  namely  Norway, 




Boreal  biome, sometimes caled ‘taiga’, is the largest terestrial  biome in the  world. 
Circumpolar in the northern parts of the world, it encompasses parts of Canada, U.S.A., 
Norway,  Sweden,  Finland, and  Russia.  Same  genuses,  disturbance regimes,  wildlife, 
climate, and processes occur within its distribution (Frelich 2013). 
After  Rio  Summit in  1993,  many countries feared that their autonomy  would  be in 
jeopardy and  decided  not to  designate any single  governmental  organisation as the 
policing entity.  FSC  was created as an independent  non-governmental  organization 
(NGO) to fulfil that position. Geting a certification was not compulsory, and it needed 
to be ‘sold’ to forest companies. Moore et al. (2012) studied the ways FSC used various 
advertising strategies, supporters,  market influence, and activists to incline forest 
companies to adopt its certification in  North  America.  The study included an email 
survey intended for forest company managers across North America. According to the 
results  of the study,  when it comes to forest certifications  most  managers  believe that 
benefits  of certifying the forest  outweigh the costs  of conforming to certification.  The 
study further focused  on the  way certification changed forestry  practices in  North 
America (Moore et al. 2012). 
Towards the end of the 20th century, multi stakeholder initiatives (MSI) in forest sector 
became a new type of forest management. Creation of MSIs is viewed as a transitional 
process, a way to involve public in a ‘democratic’ process of managing forests. FSC was 
one of the first MSIs (Moog et al. 2015). 
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FSC  has established itself as the  most influential and recognized forest certification 
entity.  Without its seal,  many forest companies and countries  do  not  have access to 
markets. Although the company deems certification as voluntary, it did everything in its 
power to restrict  uncertified  wood from entering the  market. Its certification seems to 
yield beter results in more developed countries such as Canada and Europe, while failed 
to  diminish ilegal logging in less  developed countries (Schepers  2010).  Having its 
successes in the  past,  FSC  has  not resolved socio economic  problems that threaten 
biodiversity and sustainability. The whole idea of an MSI model is being undermined by 
FSCs example (Moog et al. 2015). 
After the creation of FSC, some businesses found it too stringent and decided to create 
their  own ‘business  oriented certification’ to  make forests certified  without sacrificing 
more  money.  Over the  years,  FSC  has  won as it appealed to  general  population, 
indigenous  groups, and environmental advocates.  The  problem is that certification  has 
depended  on a socio-economic level  of  development. It  worked  best in the  developed 
world such as  Canada and  Nordic countries  where infrastructure,  governmental 
incentives, subsidies, and management practices were advanced enough to make forestry 
profitable under the stringent FSC rules. In Russia, on the other hand, FSC certification 
has not performed as wel. Although Russia occupies the same forest biome as Canada, 
Norway,  Finland, and  Sweden, it  does  not  possess the same levels  of industrial and 
socioeconomic development (Cashore et al. 2006). 
Trishkin et al. (2014) studies the  motivation for adopting forest certification in the 
northwest regions  of  Russia.  According to the study,  most companies acquired 
certification  due to  market  demand.  They also  noted that  geting certified  was a  harsh 
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change for them;  previously there  were  no customer  or  governmental standards to 
adhere to.  Companies that  were  not certified communicated that their  managerial 
departments  were too  disorganized to  be able to adopt and adhere to a certification 
scheme. Study also notes that there is lack of understanding among the companies, and 
the public of what forest certification is and what its goals are (Trishkin et al. 2014).  
A  new  Forest  Code  has  been  passed in  Russia in  2007. It emphasizes  production and 
state  profit rather than  biodiversity (Forest  Code  of the  Russian  Federation,  2007; 
Hitchcock  2010).  Furthermore according to  Lukashevich et al. (2016)  many  FSC 
directives conflict  with  Forest  Code, ‘High  Conservation  Value  Forests’ for example 
usualy located in the IFLs are not recognized by the code. Ulybina and Fennel (2013), 
found that forest certification in Russia has only benefited forestry companies, by being 
more internationaly competitive,  having insignificant efect  on sustainability and 
socioeconomic  benefits.  As  wel, according to  Ulybina and  Fennel (2013) auditors 
would try to win the auditing market by seling low-quality and cheap audits. People fear 
that certification would create a false sense of progress and curb actual modernization of 
the forest sector (Ulybina and Fennel 2013). While there is a divide between state and 
FSC rules in Russia, it is the opposite in Canada and the Nordic Countries. A study by 
Sverdrup-Thygeson et al. (2014) in Norway cannot conclude if the results of improved 
sustainability  were  due to certification  or increased awareness  of sustainable forest 
practices and forest  owner education.  Sverdrup-Thygeson et al. (2014) also  notes that 
awareness of sustainable forestry and biodiversity in both Sweden and Finland increased 
since the early  1990s,  paving the road for  development and adoption  of forest 
certification. Johansson and  Lidestav (2011)  describe a transition from  government to 
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governance,  where  government acts as a facilitator  while communities,  NGOs, and 
stakeholders together  play a role  of  decision  makers.  The trend is common in  Nordic 
countries and most of Europe (Sverdrup-Thygeson et al. 2014). Study by Roberge et al. 
(2011) in Quebec show that biodiversity indicators in areas that were certified were not 
significantly  diferent compared to those in  non-certified areas.  Forest certification in 
most cases is a means to acquire credibility and competitiveness (Roberge et al. 2011). 
Forest certification in Russia according to FSC is mostly restricted to large companies; 
middle sized and smal sized companies are usualy not certified. This is usualy due to 
unafordable certification  prices (Lukashevich et al.  2016). In  Sweden,  half  of the 
productive forest is owned by 329300 private owners (Table 1). According to Folo et al. 
(2015), in  2011  Norwegian  productive forest land  of  2.5  ha  or  greater  were  owned  by 
around 131,785 owners, 116,002 private, 1,951 un-personal, and 13832 un-identified or 
dead. In Finland, around 60 percent of forestry is owned by 632,000 families and private 
individuals (with estates larger than 2 ha), state owns 25%, 9% industries, and 5% fals 
under ‘others’ (Finnish Forest Association 2014). In Canada 94% of forestland is public, 
6%  private, and  4%  owned  by the federal  government (Natural  Resources  Canada 
2017b). In Russian Federation al forestland is publicly owned (FAO 2010).  









Russia’s  proximity to  China  makes it a lucrative  business to sel  unprocessed  wood in 
high  quantities.  Such issues as coruption, aging and crumbling infrastructure, low 
processing capacity and lack  of  proper financial and judicial support further  hinder 
development  of forestry sector inside  Russia (Simeone  2012;  Ulybina and  Fennel 
2013). Investments associated  with forest certification and  new tax  on export  of 
unprocessed  wood  makes ilegal logging a  more  desired type  of enterprise (Simeone 
2012). People in Russia do not see forest certification as a good thing. For them it is a 
novel thing ‘imposed’ by ‘The West’ to control access to market, or a way to make more 
money.  People in  Russia  do  not associate forest certification  with sustainability and 
biodiversity;  most  people  do  not even  understand the  point  biodiversity conservation 
(Ulybina and Fennel 2013).  
Russia contains a  quarter  of the  world’s forests and  FSC as the  dominant forest 
certification scheme. (Ulybina and Fennel 2013). The greatest issue FSC has in Russia 
is its lax certification eforts.  Between  2015 and  2016, there  have  been  7178  non-
compliances according to FSC (Lukashevich et al. 2016). Out of those non-compliances, 
23% of total indicators reported were indicator 1.6.6.: “The requirements of the Russian 
National FSC Standard shal be explained to staf”, i.e., no personnel training. Another 
32% out of al non-compliance indicators was 2.1.2.: “The boundaries of the area shal 
be mapped and can be identified on site” - banners and information was not displayed at 
the site for the forest area users to report any fires, ilegal activities, or any other issues 
with the forest (Lukashevich et al.  2016).  Another  21%  of indicators reported for  non 
compliance involved  withholding information from the  public, indicator  7.4.1.: “The 
primary elements of the forest management plan except confidential information shal be 
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available to  public” (Lukashevich et al.  2016).  According to audits caried  out  by 
Accreditation  Services International (2017) since  2015,  Russia has had 
disproportionately larger amount  of  non-conformities to  FSC rules than the rest 
countries in the study; Russia (23), Canada (12), Finland (8), Sweden (3), and Norway 
(2).  According to  Lukashevich et al. (2016),  most  non-compliance cases in  Russia are 
due to contradictions between FSC guidelines and Russian Forest Code, high audit costs, 
and lack of governmental incentives. 
Before the colapse  of  Soviet  Union, forestry  was taken  up  by lespromkhozes, state 
forestry companies that acted as a local  government  overseeing the  needs  of  nearby 
communities.  Lespromkhozes  were  building roads, schools, libraries, and  overseeing 
social events in the area. People felt connected and taken care of (Pipponen 1999). Once 
Soviet  Union ceased to exist, forest companies  were run from  distant  ofices and the 
needs  of the communities taken care  of  by the state.  This  disconnected  people from 
forestry and made them disinterested in forestry afairs. Further, decision making of the 
forestry companies  has shifted to large transnational corporations thus restricting local 
community involvement and reducing their decision-making ability even further. Equity 
was transfered from the local communities to corporations (Tysiachniouk and 
McDermot  2016).  As  with the case in  Karelia  with Investlesprom (Russian  origin 
transnational corporation), unless local communities are backed by large NGO’s to help 
negotiate their rights, logging companies can interpret context  of  FSC certification to 
exclude local involvement as  much as  possible in favour  of increased  profit. 
Communities that do not have the backing of large transnational NGOs or are too smal 




The work by Kortelainen (2012) describes how new approaches of trans-boundary forest 
governance afect forestry in  Russia.  With the introduction  of forest certification and 
work  of  various  NGOs  Russian forest sector started adopting transnational  network-
space forest  governance.  The study  outlines  benefits and  drawbacks  of this system in 
Russia. Creation of closed FSC controled trans-boundary networks ensures that political 
borders do not interfere with proper management of timber resources. On the other hand 
FSC stamp  on  wood coming from this  network  does  not state the specific location  of 
harvest and could come from any part of the said network (Kortelainen 2012). 
FSC certification by area can be seen in Figure 1 for Canada and Figure 2 for Russia. 
Table  2  describes area certified  under  FSC for  Canada,  Finland,  Norway,  Russia, and 
Sweden.  According to  Certification  Canada (2016),  FSC certification in  Canada  has 
decreased in favour of Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI). 
Table 2 FSC certification data (Borealforests.org;[FFA] 2016; FSC 2017; Natural 
Resources Canada 2017a; The Guardian 2009). 
Country Canada Finland Norway Russia Sweden 
FSC certified 
(ha) 




232 20.3 7.2 416.925 23.256 
% Certified 
Managed 
24% 7% 6% 10% 52% 
Total Forest 
(milion ha) 








Figure 2 FSC Zones in Russia as of October 1 2013 (Blank - borders of subjects to 
Russian Federation; Blue - in progress of certification; Green – certified; Magenta - 
certification halted) (FSC 2013). 
Intact Forest Landscape (IFL) wil be the key feature behind the Motion 65 proposed by 
FSC.  There are  many  diferent  views  on  what  defines an Intact  Forest  Landscape. 
Potapov et al. (2017b) describes IFL as an unbroken area of natural forest with litle to 
no  human  disturbance that is at least  50,000  ha  with a  minimum  10  km  breadth and 
minimum 2 km wide coridors linking diferent patches. It fals under FSCs Principle 9, 
which  deals  with ‘high conservation  value’ (HCV) forests (FSC  2015).  Definition  of 
HCV-2 is: “Globaly, regionaly  or  nationaly significant large landscape level forest 
areas” (Tysiachniouk and McDermot 2016). Russian boreal contains quite a substantial 
number  of IFLs - 28.3%  of  Russian forests  which are considered a critical  world 
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heritage are IFLs. However,  Forestry  Code  of  Russian  Federation  does  not recognize 
IFLs (Lukashevich et al.  2016;  Tysiachniouk and  McDermot  2016). In  2014 the 
Russian branch of Greenpeace separated from FSC in order to pressure it to change its 
certification requirements towards protecting IFL’s. According to Tysiachniouk, (2009) 
FSC  has  been  quite lax in implementing its  own  policy towards  protecting IFL’s in 
Russia (Tysiachniouk and  McDermot  2016).  Tysiachniouk and  McDermot (2016) 
noted limited involvement from local actors in the  decision-making regarding  HCVs, 
further  underlining  distance  between local communities and  FSC, although state 
oversight slightly improved local involvement.  According to  FSC  data,  over  85%  of 
Canadian  boreal forest is fragmented and  only  15% is IFLs.  Furthermore,  80%  of the 
intact forest in any  given  Forest  Management  Unit (FMU)  wil  be considered an IFL 
(Potapov et al.  2008).  The  motion  wil  merge four  Canadian standards (B-C,  National 
Boreal,  Maritimes,  Great  Lakes/St.  Lawrence) into  one. In  Sweden,  3%  of total forest 
zone is considered an IFL, 1.4% in Norway, and 3.1% in Finland (Potapov et al. 2017a). 
FSC  based their IFL standards  on the study  by  Potapov et al. (2008).  Potapov et al. 
(2008) defined an IFL, basing their work on papers by Noss (1990), Anderson (1991), 
and Bryant et al. (1997). Neither Noss (1990), Anderson (1991), nor Bryant et al. (1997) 





Russia is  diferent from  Canada,  Finland,  Norway, and  Sweden.  Mostly  due to its 
distinct  political and socioeconomic  history.  During the era  of  Soviet  Union local 
communities were taken care of by leskhozes, state owned forestry companies. Al the 
needs of a community would be met by leskhozes, including timber, fuel wood, schools, 
infrastructure, employment, and  governance.  Privatization  of forestry  by large 
transnational  holding companies created a  divide  between local communities and 
forestry.  Every  decision  was  made at a corporate level.  People lost  power  of agency, 
equity, and sense  of connection.  According to the case in  Karelia (NW  Russia), 
certification  does litle to improve local equity and  welfare  distribution.  Procedural 
equity  did  not improve as  wel for local  population.  Large transnational  holding 
companies  would interpret  FSC  guidelines in favour  of their  own  profit rather than 
equity for the local communities. In large communities in NW Russia, local population 
can secure their rights through series of negotiations with help of large NGOs backed by 
transnational advocacy groups. These rights were supposed to be secured by FSC. Smal 
communities that do not have much negotiating power or backing of powerful NGOs are 
the most disadvantaged. 
When it comes to FSC in Russia, stringency of audits and oversight of certificate issuing 
is  much  more lax as compared to  other  parts  of the  boreal.  There are a  number  of 
reasons for that. It al comes down to local population. FSC in Russia is seen as more of 
an  obstruction rather than a  goal.  Canada and  Nordic countries  have significantly 
diferent  political and socioeconomic  backgrounds as compared to  Russia so it is 
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ilogical to expect similar results from similar tactics.  To  be able to achieve a level  of 
conformity similar to  Canada and  Nordic  Countries,  FSC  has to tailor its tactics to 
Russia.  
Involvement of communities in forestry has a positive efect on certification compliance. 
When  people  have agency and equity they start to  get involved, this in efect causes 
awareness  of the  benefits that come  with certification.  Right  now  people in  Russia 
associate  FSC  with  mercantilist forest corporations that acquire it for the  profit,  or 
economic bariers created by the Western countries to control Russia. Good stewardship 
starts with the people, FSC was born in the western world, its principles are foreign and 
untrustworthy for the people that lived in a socialist structure.  
In Canada and Nordic Countries forest certification was adopted naturaly as it evolved. 
It started with education, and increase in awareness about biodiversity and sustainability. 
It was easier to implement certification where people have beter agency and meaningful 
connection to the land.  Where  people  have  more agency, equity and socioeconomic 
problems do not persist. FSC guidelines are in tandem with state forestry guidelines in 
Canada and  Nordic countries such as  Norway, Sweden, and  Finland. In  Russian 
Federation laws are  not in sync  with  FSC standards.  The  Forestry  Code  of  Russian 
Federation for example conflicts with FSC guidelines, particularly IFLs.  
No empirical  data  behind the  development  of  definition  of an IFL is leaving some 
people concerned over the legitimacy of the description of the definition. Thus adding to 
the  problem  of adherence to the standard.  Non-recognition  of an IFL  by the  Forestry 
Code  of the  Russian  Federation adds to this concern.  FSCs  HCV-2 standard (Faling 
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under  principle  9  of  FSC’s  Principles and  Criteria) that  deals  with IFLs  gets  under 
implemented in Russia. It must be noted that 28.3% of Russian forestland is IFL. This 
situation led to Russian ofice of Greenpeace dropping its FSC membership in order to 
pressure  FSC from the  outside. It is  yet  unknown if  Motion  65  would improve the 
situation or exacerbate the problem of FSC stringency in Russia. Motion 65 would have 
diferent efect in the other countries mentioned. Nordic countries are mostly privately 
owned and their forests are  heavily  managed  which lessens efects  of  Motion  65. In 
Sweden,  3%  of total forest zone is considered an IFL,  1.4% in  Norway, and  3.1% in 
Finland. Forestland in Canada is 15% IFL. In Canada however, FSC certification does 
not hold a large enough share to cause too many problems for forestry. In fact, share of 
FSC certification in Canada has been dropping over the last few years in favour of other 
certification bodies.  
CONCLUSION 
As  Compared to  Canada and  Nordic countries,  FSC eforts in  Russia show lower 
stringency in auditing, certification compliance,  biodiversity, and improvement in 
socioeconomic welbeing of local communities. Special concern should be addressed to 
protection of HCV-2 under principle 9 of the FSC Principles and Criteria. FSC needs to 
adapt its tactics to solve certification dificulties caused by socioeconomic conditions in 
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